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Abstract
We study the game-theoretic task of selecting mobile agents to deliver multiple items on a
network. An instance is given by m packages (physical objects) which have to be transported
between specified source–target pairs in an undirected graph, and k mobile heterogeneous agents,
each being able to transport one package at a time. Following a recent model [6], each agent
i has a different rate of energy consumption per unit distance traveled, i.e., its weight. We are
interested in optimizing or approximating the total energy consumption over all selected agents.
Unlike previous research, we assume the weights to be private values known only to the
respective agents. We present three different mechanisms which select, route and pay the agents
in a truthful way that guarantees voluntary participation of the agents, while approximating
the optimum energy consumption by a constant factor. To this end, we analyze a previous
structural result and an approximation algorithm given in [6]. Finally, we show that for some
instances in the case of a single package, the sum of the payments can be bounded in terms of
the optimum.
1 Introduction
We study the delivery of physical objects (henceforth called packages) by mobile agents. Re-
gardless of whether large volumes are transported by motor lorries or cargo airplanes, or whether
autonomous drones deliver your groceries, the fuel or battery consumption of the transporting agent
is a major cost factor. The main concern for algorithm-design thus focuses on an energy-efficient
operation of these agents. The primary energy expense is defined by the movements of the agents;
in this paper we consider the energy consumption to be proportional to the distance traveled by an
agent. We assume the agents to be heterogeneous in the sense of the agents having different rates
of energy consumption.
Recent progress in minimizing the total energy consumption in delivery problems has been made
assuming that the agents belong to the same entity which wants to deliver the packages [6]. It has
been shown that there is a polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithm with the ratio
depending on the energy consumption rates.
In the following, however, we assume the agents to be independent selfish agents which make a
bid to transport packages. Think for instance of a cargo company that hires subcontractors (like
independent lorry drivers or individual couriers) to outsource the delivery of packages to these
agents. In this scenario, the rate of energy consumption is a private value known only to the
respective agent. Our goal is hence to design a mechanism for the cargo company to select agents,
plan the agents’ routes and reimburse them in a way such that:
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Figure 1: Delivery of a single package on a path of length k; consecutive agents of weight wi =
1
k+i .
(left) Optimal solution using all agents; cost =
∑k
i=1wi · 1 =
∑k
i=1
1
k+i = H2k −Hk ≈ ln 2 (k →∞).
(right) Any solution using a single agent i has cost wi·((i− 1) + k) = (k+i−1)/(k+i) ≈ 1 (k →∞).
1. the energy spent overall is as close to the optimum as possible,
2. each agent announces its true rate of energy consumption in its bid, and
3. each agent is reimbursed at least the cost of energy it needs to deliver all of its packages.
Our model. We are given a connected, undirected graph G = (V,E) on n := |V | nodes with
the length of each edge, together with m packages, each of which is given by a specified source-
target node pair (sj , tj). Furthermore there are k > 1 mobile agents initially located at distinct
nodes of the graph. Each agent i starts at position pi and can carry at most one package at a time.
An agent can pick up a package at some node u and drop the package again at some other node
v. In that sense it is also possible to hand over a package j between agents if agent a drops it at a
node where another agent b later picks up the same package, in which case we say that the agents
collaborate on package j. A scenario in which each package j is delivered from its source sj to its
target tj is called a feasible solution of the delivery problem. Such a feasible solution x specifies
the travel distance di(x) that each agent i has to travel in this solution.
Each agent consumes energy proportional to the distance it travels in the graph, and we are
interested in optimizing the total energy consumption for the team of agents. Specifically, we
consider heterogeneous agents with different rates of energy consumption (weights wi), and therefore
the energy spent by agent i in solution x is wi ·di(x), while the total energy of a solution is (see e.g.,
Figures 1,2): cost(x,w) :=
∑k
i=1wi ·di(x), where w = (w1, . . . , wk). We denote by Opt a solution
with minimum cost among all solutions, Opt ∈ arg minx cost(x,w). It is natural to consider the
scenario in which every agent is selfish and therefore cares only about its own cost (energy) and
not about the optimum social cost (total energy).
Mechanism design. We consider the scenario in which agents can cheat or speculate about
their costs: each wi is private piece of information known to agent i who can report a possibly
different w′i. For instance, an agent may find it convenient to report a very high cost, in order to
induce the underlying algorithm to assign a shorter travel distance to it (which may not be globally
optimal). To deal with such situations, we introduce suitable compensations for the agents to
incentivize them to truthfully report their costs. This combination of an algorithm and a payment
rule is called a mechanism, and we are interested in the following:
• Optimality. The mechanism runs some (nearly) optimal algorithm such that, if agents do not
misreport, the computed solution has an optimal (or nearly optimal) social cost cost(x,w)
with respect to the true weights w.
• Truthfulness. For every agent, truth-telling is a dominant strategy, i.e., in no circumstance it
is beneficial for an agent to misreport its cost. Thus, independently of the other agents, its
utility (payment minus incurred cost) is maximized when reporting the true cost.
2
• Frugality. The total payment to the agents should be nearly optimal, that is, comparable to
the total energy cost. Since agents should be payed at least their own cost when truthfully
reporting (voluntary participation), the mechanism must pay at least cost(x,w).
Intuitively speaking, we are paying the agents to make sure that they reveal their true costs, and,
in this way, we can find a (nearly) optimal solution (w.r.t. the sum of weighted travel distances).
At the same time, we want to minimize our total payments, i.e., we would like not to spend much
more than the actual cost (weighted travel distance) of the solution.
Our results. After some preliminaries on mechanism design and on energy-efficient delivery
in Section 2, we first investigate in Section 3.1 the constant-factor (4 ·max wiwj )-approximation
algorithm presented in [6]. We reason why this algorithm cannot be turned into a mechanism
that is both truthful and guarantees voluntary participation. However, using the algorithm as a
black box for a new algorithm A∗ and applying Clarke’s pivot rule for the payments to the agents,
we give a truthful mechanism based on A∗ which guarantees voluntary participation and incurs a
total energy of at most (4 ·max wiwj ) times the energy cost of an optimal delivery.
In Section 3.2, we consider instances where either the number of packages m is constant or
the number of agents k is constant. For both cases we provide constant-factor approximation
algorithms with approximation factors that are independent of the agents’ weights. Both of these
approximation algorithms satisfy sufficient conditions to be turned into truthful mechanisms with
voluntary participation. The running time of the former algorithm can be improved to yield a FPT -
approximation mechanism, parametrized by the number of packages; the latter runs in exponential
time with k as the base of the exponential term.
Finally, in Section 4, we discuss the frugality of mechanisms for the case of a single package.
In particular, we consider two truthful mechanisms, namely, the optimal one (which possibly uses
several agents), and the one which always uses a single agent only. Although the latter results in
a higher energy cost, it might need a smaller sum of payments. However, under some assumptions
on the input, the payments of both mechanisms are only a small multiplicative factor larger than
the minimum necessary (the cost of the optimum).
Related work. Energy-efficient delivery has not been studied until recently. Most previous
results are based on a model where the agents have uniform rates of energy-consumption but limited
battery [8]. This restricts the possible movements of the agents – one gets the decision problem of
whether the given packages can be delivered without exceeding the available battery levels. This
turns out to be NP-hard even for a single package [9, 4] and even if energy can be exchanged between
the agents [11]. The model of unbounded battery but heterogeneous weights has been introduced
recently [6] (for the full version see [5]). Besides the mentioned approximation algorithm, it was
shown that a restricted solution in which each package is delivered by a single agent approximates
an optimum delivery (in which agents can handover a package to another agent) by a factor of at
most 2. This result has been named the Benefit of Collaboration. Furthermore, the problem is
NP-hard to approximate to within a small constant, even for a single agent.
Approximating the maximum travel distance of k agents has been studied for other tasks such
as visiting a set of given arcs [17], or visiting all nodes of a tree [16]. Furthermore Demaine et al. [12]
studied fixed-parameter tractability for minimizing both the sum of as well as the maximum travel
distance of agents for several tasks such as pattern formation, parametrized by the number of
agents k. These models consider only unweighted agents.
The problem of performing some collaborative task using selfish agents is well studied in al-
gorithmic game theory and, in particular, in algorithmic mechanism design [21] where the system
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pays the agents in order to make sure that they report their costs truthfully. The existence of com-
putationally feasible truthful mechanisms is one of the central questions, as truthfulness is often
obtained by running an exact algorithm [22]. In addition, even for simple problems, like shortest
path, the mechanism may have to pay a lot to the agents [14, 3]. Network flow problems have been
studied for the case when selfish agents own edges of the network and the mechanism pays them
in order to deliver packages [1, 19]. A setting where the transported packages are selfish entities
which choose from fixed-route transportation providers was recently studied in [15]. In a sense, this
is the reverse setting of our problem.
2 Preliminaries
Mechanisms. A mechanism is a pair (A,P ) where A is an algorithm and P a payment scheme
which, for a given vector w′ = (w′1, . . . , w′k) of costs reported by the agents, computes a solution
A(w′) and a payment Pi(w′) for each agent i.
Definition 1 (Truthful mechanism). A mechanism (A,P ) is truthful if truth-telling is a dominant
strategy (utility maximizing) for all agents. That is, for any vector w′ = (w′1, . . . , w′k) of costs
reported by the agents, for any i, and for any true cost wi of agent i, Pi(w
′) − wi · di(A(w′)) ≤
Pi(wi, w
′
−i) − wi · di(A(wi, w′−i)), where di(x) is the travel distance of agent i in solution x, and
where w′−i := (w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i−1, w
′
i+1, . . . , w
′
k) and (wi, w
′
−i) := (w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i−1, wi, w
′
i+1, . . . , w
′
k).
Truthfulness can be achieved through a construction known as VCG mechanisms [27, 10, 18],
which requires that the underlying algorithm satisfies certain ‘optimality’ conditions:
Definition 2 (VCG-based mechanism). A VCG-based mechanism is a pair (A,P ) of the following
form: For any vector w′ = (w′1, . . . , w′k) of costs reported by the agents, and for each agent i, there
is a function Qi() independent of w
′
i such that i is payed an amount of
Pi(w
′) = Qi(w′−i)−
(∑
j 6=iw
′
j · dj(A(w′))
)
. (1)
Intuitively speaking, these mechanisms turn out to be truthful, whenever the underlying algo-
rithm minimizes the social cost with respect to a fixed subset of solutions (in particular, an optimal
algorithm always yields a truthful mechanism):
Theorem 1 (Proposition 3.1 in [22]). A VCG-based mechanism (A,P ) is truthful if algorithm A
minimizes the social cost over a fixed subset RA of solutions. That is, there exists RA such that,
for every w′, A(w′) ∈ arg minx∈RA{cost(x,w′)}.
The above result is a simple rewriting of the one in [22] which is originally stated for a more
general setting, in which agent i valuates a solution x by an amount vi(x), and vi() is the private
information. Our setting is the special case in which these valuations are all of the form vi(x) =
−wi · di(x) and wi is the private information (this setting is also called one-parameter [2]).
Definition 3 (Voluntary participation). A mechanism (A,P ) satisfies the voluntary participa-
tion condition if truth-telling agents have always a nonnegative utility. That is, for every w′ =
(w′1, . . . , w′k), and for every agent i, Pi(w
′)− w′i · di(A(w′)) ≥ 0.
We assume there are at least two agents (otherwise the problem is trivial and there is no point
in doing mechanism design; also one can easily show that voluntary participation and truthfulness
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Figure 2: (left) Optimal solution of cost 2 · 17 + 3 · 4 = 46 with collaboration on packages 1 and 3.
(middle) Optimal solution among all non-collaborative solutions with energy cost 2 ·16 + 3 ·5 = 47.
(right) Optimal non-collaborative solution with direct delivery and return; total energy 2·2·18 = 72.
cannot be achieved in this case). Voluntary participation can be obtained by the standard Clarke
pivot rule, setting in the payments (1) the functions Qi() as follows:
Qi(w
′
−i) := cost(A(⊥, w′−i), w′−i) (2)
where (⊥, w′−i) is the instance in which agent i is not present. Note that, if algorithm A runs in
polynomial time, then the payments can also be computed in polynomial time: we only need to
recompute k solutions using A and their costs. The next is a well-known result:
Fact 1. The VCG-based mechanism (A,P ) with the payments in (2) satisfies voluntary partici-
pation if the algorithm satisfies the following condition: For any vector w′ and for any agent i,
cost(A(⊥, w′−i), w′) ≥ cost(A(w′), w′).
Proof. Observe that the utility of agent i is
Qi(w
′
−i)−
(∑
j 6=i
w′j · dj(A(w′))
)
− wi · di(A(w′)) = Qi(w′−i)− cost(A(w′), (wi, w′−i))
= cost(A(⊥, w′−i), w′−i)− cost(A(w′), (wi, w′−i)).
When i is truth-telling we have w′i = wi, and w
′ = (wi, w′−i). Also, cost(A(⊥, w′−i), w′−i) =
cost(A(⊥, w′−i), w′) because i is not present in solution A(⊥, w′−i). Hence the utility of i is
cost(A(⊥, w′−i), w′)− cost(A(w′), w′), which is non-negative by assumption.
Definition 4 (Approximation mechanism). A mechanism (A,P ) is a c−approximation mecha-
nism, if for every input vector of bids w′ its algorithm A computes a solution A(w′) which is a
c−approximation of a best solution Opt(w′), i.e., cost(A(w′), w′) ≤ c · cost(Opt(w′), w′).
Collaboration of agents. To describe a solution for an instance of the delivery problem,
we can (among other characteristics) elaborate on the following properties of the solution: How
do agents work together on each package (collaboration), how are agents assigned to packages
(coordination) and which route does each agent take (planning). Most of the mechanisms in this
paper are based on the characterizations of the benefit of collaboration:
Definition 5 (Benefit of collaboration). Define RnoC as the set of solutions x in which there is no
collaboration of the agents, meaning that each package is delivered by a single agent only. Define
R?noC ⊂ RnoC as the subset of solutions x ∈ RnoC in which (i) every package is transported directly
from source to target without intermediate dropoffs, and (ii) every agent returns to its respective
starting location. The ratios BoC := min
x∈RnoC
cost(x,w)
cost(Opt,w) and BoC
∗ := min
x∈R?noC
cost(x,w)
cost(Opt,w) are called
benefit of collaboration.
Theorem 2 (Theorems 5, 6 & 7 in [6]). For the the benefit of collaboration we have BoC ≤ 1/ ln 2
for a single package (m = 1, for a tight lower bound example see Fig. 1), and BoC ≤ BoC∗ ≤ 2
in general (m ≥ 1, see for example Fig. 2).
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3 Truthful Approximation Mechanisms
In this section, we present two polynomial-time truthful mechanisms. Note that energy-efficient
delivery is NP-hard to approximate to within any constant approximation ratio less than 367/366
[6, Theorem 9]. Hence, even in the best case, our goal can only be to guarantee a constant-factor
approximation of the optimum in a truthful way.
In the first part we present a polynomial-time truthful approximation mechanism with a constant-
factor approximation guarantee depending on the weights of the agents. In the second part we turn
to absolute constant-factor approximation, for which we require the number of packages m to be
constant in order to get a polynomial-time mechanism. Similar techniques yield a mechanism
running in exponential time for a constant number of agents k.
Main algorithmic issue. The two truthful polynomial-time approximation mechanisms we
obtain are based on the following scheme (and the third approximation mechanism follows the same
scheme but takes exponential time):
1. Precompute a feasible subset R of solutions independently of the input weights w′. This set
may depend on the name/index and on the position of the agents.
2. Among all precomputed solutions in R, return the best solution with respect to the input
weights w′, that is, a solution x∗ ∈ arg minx∈R{cost(x,w′)}.
Truthfulness then follows directly by Theorem 1. Note that, since we want polynomial running time,
the first step selects a polynomial number of solutions (thus the second step is also polynomial).
The main crux here is to make sure that, for all possible input weights w′, the set R contains at
least one good approximation (a solution x ∈ R whose cost for w′ is at most a constant factor above
the optimum for w′).
3.1 A polynomial-time approximation mechanism
We start with the general setting of arbitrarily many packages m and arbitrarily many agents k. Our
construction of a truthful approximation mechanism (A∗, P ) for this setting relies on Theorem 1.
To this end, we define a fixed subset of solutions RA∗ and a polynomial-time algorithm A
∗, such
that for every vector of reported weights w′, the algorithm A∗ computes a solution S of optimum
cost among all solutions in RA∗ , S ∈ arg minx∈RA∗ cost(x,w′).
In a next step, we show that whenever the agents report truthfully (w′ = w), the computed
solution x ∈ RA∗ has an energy cost that approximates the overall optimum energy cost by a
constant factor of at most 4 · wmaxwmin , where wmax := maxiwi and wmin := miniwi.
A first approach. We first analyze an existing approximation algorithm Apos presented in [6],
which computes a solution depending only on the position of the agents, but not on their reported
costs. Roughly speaking, Apos connects the agent positions and the package sources and targets
by a minimum spanning forest, subject to the following: In each tree, there is (i) an edge between
the corresponding source/target nodes sj , tj and (ii) exactly one agent position pi. All edge lengths
correspond to the distances in the original instance. Agent i then traverses its tree in a DFS-like
fashion, crossing each edge twice and thus delivering all packages in the tree. For an example of
such a solution, see Figure 3 (left).
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Algorithm A∗
Input: Connected graph G, k agents, m packages, black box algorithm Apos (Thm. 3).
Output: A solution S with cost at most the cost of Apos.
1: Compute the following k + 1 solutions using Apos as a black box subroutine:
x0 := Apos(w
′), and ∀i = 1, . . . , k : x−i := Apos(⊥, w′−i).
All solutions in the set RA∗ := {x0, x−1, . . . , x−k} are feasible by connectivity of G.
2: Define algorithm A∗ as taking the best among all these solutions with respect to the input
weights w′:
A∗(w′) := arg min
x∈RA∗
{cost(x,w′)} .
Theorem 3 (Theorem 13 in [6]). For any number of packages m and agents k, there exists a
polynomial-time algorithm Apos which computes a (4 · wmaxwmin )-approximation. The computed solution
does not depend on the input weights w, only on the position of the agents.
However, there is no mechanism (Apos, P ) which is both truthful and guarantees voluntary partic-
ipation: Assume for the sake of contradiction there is such a mechanism. To guarantee voluntary
participation we need the payments to satisfy Pi(w
′)−wi · di(Apos(w′)) ≥ 0 for each agent i. Con-
sider any agent i which is used in the solution, i.e., di(Apos(wi, w
′
−i)) > 0. Note that Apos selected
i independent of its weight wi, hence di remains the same for all reported weights w
′
i, i.e., we have
di := di(Apos(wi, w
′
−i)) = di(Apos(w
′
i, w
′
−i)). Let Pi(wi, w
′
−i) denote the payment to agent i when
she reports her true weight wi. Now consider a situation where agent i reports a different value
w′i > Pi(wi, w
′
−i)/di instead: For voluntary participation of agent i, the payment Pi(w
′) needs to
satisfy Pi(w
′)−w′i ·di ≥ 0⇔ Pi(w′) ≥ w′i ·di, but w′i ·di > Pi(wi, w′−i), contradicting the truthfulness
of the mechanism (in other words: reporting an arbitrary high weight results in an arbitrary high
payment).
Refining the approach. In order to obtain a truthful mechanism with voluntary participa-
tion we consider the algorithm A∗ obtained from Apos and a repeated application of algorithm Apos
on all subsets of (k − 1) agents (for feasibility recall that G is connected and that k > 1).
Theorem 4. There exists a polynomial-time truthful VCG mechanism (A∗, P ) satisfying voluntary
participation with approximation ratio of at most the approximation ratio of Apos.
Proof. We use VCG payments (1) with (2) asQi(w
′
−i) := cost(Apos(⊥, w′−i), w′−i) = cost(x−i, w′−i).
Since in Step 1 every solution is computed independently of the input weights, algorithm A∗ sat-
isfies the conditions of Theorem 1, which implies truthfulness. We show voluntary participation
along the lines of Fact 1: First note that by Step 2 in A∗:
cost(A∗(w′), w′) ≤ cost(Apos(⊥, w′−i), w′) , (3)
since the solution x−i = Apos(⊥, w′−i) is a feasible solution that A∗ considers on input w′. By the
same argument, the approximation ratio of A∗ is at most the approximation ratio of Apos(w). For
voluntary participation, note that for w′i = wi, i’s utility is
Qi(w
′
−i)−
(∑
j 6=i
w′j · dj(A∗(w′))
)
− wi · di(A∗(w′)) = Qi(w′−i)− cost(A∗(w′), (wi, w′−i))
= cost(Apos(⊥, w′−i), w′−i)− cost(A∗(w′), (w′i, w′−i))
(3)
≥ 0.
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Figure 3: (from left to right) Original solution x0 = Apos with energy cost cost(x0, w) = 46,
solutions x−1, x−2, x−3 with energy cost(x−1, w) = 46, cost(x−2, w) = 10 and cost(x−3, w) =
160.
For an illustration of the computed set RA∗ , see Figure 3: The mechanism (A
∗, P ) will pick
solution x−2 and award payments P1 = 46− (10− 4) = 40, P2 = 0, P3 = 160− (10− 6) = 156.
3.2 Absolute constant-factor approximation mechanisms
We now turn to developing truthful mechanisms where the approximation guarantee will be an
absolute constant, therefore independent of the weights (cf. Theorems 3 and 4). To this end,
we provide a polynomial-time truthful approximation mechanism if the number of packages m is
constant. We also show that by slightly deviating from the 2-step scheme given in the beginning of
this section, the running time of the algorithm can be improved to f(m) ·(kn)O(1), where f depends
only on m. Hence we get a truthful fixed parameter tractable (FPT) approximation mechanism,
parametrized by the number of packages. To the best of our knowledge, the underlying algorithm
is also the first absolute constant-factor approximation for the delivery problem. For the case of
only constantly many agents k, we provide an exponential-time algorithm, where k is the base of
the exponential term.
No collaboration. In the following, we consider only solutions x ∈ R?noC where agents do
not collaborate and follow the two properties given in Theorem 2. We are therefore left with the
tasks of coordinating which agent gets assigned to which packages and planning in which order she
delivers the assigned packages. In other words, in every such solution x ∈ R?noC, each agent i is
assigned a (possibly empty) block of packages Mi(x) = {i1, i2, . . . , i|Mi(x)|}. These package blocks
are disjoint and form a partition of all m packages {1, . . . ,m}. Furthermore, agent i delivers each
of its packages directly after picking it up at its source. These packages are processed in some
order pix(i1), pix(i2), . . . , pix(i|Mi(x)|), where pix is a permutation of {1, . . . ,m}. Finally, i returns to
its starting location pi. Therefore, denoting the distance between u and v in G by dist(u, v), the
travel distance di(x) of agent i can be written as
di(x) = dist
(
pi, spix(i1)
)
+
|Mi|∑
j=1
dist
(
spix(ij), tpix(ij)
)
+
|Mi|−1∑
j=1
dist
(
tpix(ij), spix(ij+1)
)
+ dist
(
tpix(i|Mi|), pi
)
. (4)
Remark 1. In the dist(u, v) terms in (4) we are not interested in the actual route agent i takes,
as long as it uses a shortest path between u and v.
Sets and lists. To clarify the use of package blocks and package orders, we use the standard
notion of sets and lists regarding partitions (see e.g., [7]): If we look at a partition of {1, . . . ,m}
into non-empty disjoint blocks, we can take into account the order of the elements within blocks,
the order of the blocks, or both. We get four cases: sets of sets, sets of lists, lists of sets and lists
of lists ([23, 24, 25, 26]). However, in the delivery setting we can also have agents which are not
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Algorithm Am (for a constant number m of packages)
Input: Connected graph G, k agents, m packages.
Output: An optimal solution S ∈ R?noC.
1: Brute-force enumeration over all lists of exactly k possibly empty lists of the packages.
foreach list of k lists do
Add the corresponding solution (Fact 2) to the set of solutions RAm .
end foreach
2: Define algorithm Am as taking the best among all solutions in RAm with respect to the input
weights w′:
Am(w′) := arg min
x∈RAm
{cost(x,w′)} .
used at all and therefore not assigned to any packages – a complete description (coordination +
planning) of a solution x ∈ R?noC is therefore given by a list of exactly k (possibly empty) lists,
M = (M1, . . . ,Mk), where list Mi represents the sequence of the packages that agent i has to
deliver in the order specified by Mi. Hence, we immediately get a bijection from all lists of exactly
k possibly empty lists to R?noC (modulo the equivalence between shortest paths – see Remark 1).
Fact 2. For every such list of lists M , there is a solution xM ∈ R?noC in which each agent i delivers
the packages in Mi in the order specified by this list and in which the cost is minimized. Given M ,
such a solution can be computed in time poly(n,m, k).
Constant number of packages m
We now look at the case of a constant number m of packages. By Theorem 2, the solution
S := arg minx∈R?noC cost(x,w) is a 2−approximation of the optimum. First, we present an al-
gorithm Am which basically enumerates over all lists of exactly k (possibly empty) lists and adds
the corresponding solution to a set RAm (where we get RAm = R
?
noC), as described in the first
step of our scheme. Then, given an input vector of weights w′, Am chooses the best solution
Am(w′) ∈ arg minx∈R?noC {cost(x,w′}.
Theorem 5. Algorithm Am finds a best solution S ∈ arg min
x∈R?noC
cost(x,w) and can be implemented
to run in time O (m!(k +m)m · poly(n,m, k)).
Proof. Step 1 of Am produces O(m! · (m+k−1k−1 )) many solutions and can be implemented in time
O (m!(k +m)m · poly(m, k)) as follows: Since we look at a list of lists we have a total order on the
packages. Hence we first enumerate in an outer loop over all m! permutations, which can be done
in time O(m!). Each such permutation also needs to be subdivided into exactly k possibly empty
lists. There are
(
m+k−1
k−1
) ≤ (k+m)m many ways to do this (by placing k−1 delimiters at m+k−1
potential positions in time O (poly(m, k))). Step 2 of Am consists of computing the cost of each
solution x ∈ R?noC in time O (poly(n,m, k)).
Theorem 6. For a constant number of packages m, there exists a polynomial-time truthful VCG
mechanism (Am, P ), satisfying voluntary participation, with approximation ratio ≤ 2.
Proof. Theorem 5 says that the algorithm satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1, and thus truthful-
ness holds. Theorem 5 also implies the running time. The approximation is due to Theorem 2 and
the definition of the benefit of collaboration BoC∗. We next argue that the algorithm satisfies the
condition in Fact 1, cost(Am(w′), w′) ≤ cost(Am(⊥, w′−i), w′). Indeed, every solution Am(⊥, w′−i)
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Algorithm Am (improved version)
Input: Connected graph G, k agents, m packages.
Output: An optimal solution S ∈ R?noC.
Enumerate over all sets of (non-empty) lists of the packages 1, . . . ,m.
foreach set of ≤ k lists do
foreach pair (agent i, list Mj) do
1a: Assume agent i delivers the packages in Mj in their order.
1b: Compute the cost di(Mj) of doing so.
end foreach
2a: Build a complete bipartite graph Agents–Lists
with edge costs wi · di(Mj) for each edge {i,Mj}.
2b: Find the best assignment Agents → Lists
(by computing a maximum weighted bipartite matching).
foreach subset of k − 1 agents do
3: Repeat 2a, 2b for the subset of k − 1 agents.
end foreach
4: Keep track of the best solution(s) found so far.
end foreach
is also considered by the algorithm when all agents are present (input w′), since this solution cor-
responds to some list of k lists M in which agent i is not given any package (i.e. Mi = ∅). Thus
the solution Am(⊥, w′−i) is contained in R?noC.
We now show that the running time of the mechanism (Am, P ) can be improved. The main
idea is to enumerate in Am over all sets of lists instead of list of lists – i.e. during the enumeration
we do not fix yet which agent gets which list of packages. Rather for each set of lists, we aim to
directly compute an optimal assignment between the agents and the lists, thus deciding for every
fixed set of lists in a parallel way the assigned list for every agent (instead of enumerating over all
possible assignments as well).
Theorem 7. The running time of the truthful VCG mechanism (Am, P ) can be improved to show
fixed parameter tractablility, parametrized by the number of packages, namely a running time of
O(f(m) · poly(n, k)), where f(m) ∈ O
(
e2
√
m−mmm · poly(m)
)
.
Proof. Consider first the running time of the improved algorithm Am, which iterates over all
sets of non-empty lists of the packages 1, . . . ,m. The number of sets of lists is known to be
O(e2
√
m−mmm/poly(m)) [24]. To this end we enumerate over all sets of lists while spending only
an additional O(poly(m))-factor (over the number of sets of lists) on the running time. This can
be done by enumerating over all sets of sets (by considering packages one-by-one and deciding
whether to put them in a previously created subset or whether to start a new subset), followed by
enumerating over all permutations of the packages inside each subset.
For each of the sets of at most k lists, we compute the best assignment of the k agents to the lists
(say l ≤ k many) with a weighted bipartite matching as follows: On one side of the bipartite graph,
we have k vertices, one for each agent. On the other side, we have one vertex per list. We take the
complete bipartite graph between the two sides. This graph has at most k · l ≤ k ·m edges. We
compute the cost of an (agent, list)-edge as the energy cost of delivering all packages in the bundle
in that order with that agent. This requires O(poly(n,m)) time per edge and O(poly(n, k,m)) time
in total. A maximum matching of minimum cost in this graph gives the best assignment of agents
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to bundles and can be found in polynomial time, e.g., by using the Hungarian method [20] or the
successive shortest path algorithm [13].
It remains to show that truthfulness and voluntary participation also hold for the improved
version of algorithm Am. Truthfulness follows immediately from the fact that Am still considers all
solutions x ∈ R?noC, albeit always several of them in a parallel fashion. To be able to apply Clarke’s
pivot rule to define the payments via Qi(w
′
−i) we make sure to also consider all solutions on all k
different subsets of k − 1 agents, see Step 3 of the improved algorithm Am.
Constant number of agents k
Next, we look at settings with a constant number of agents k but an arbitrary number of packages
m. In this case, even for k = 1 and independent of whether or not we restrict the packages to
be transported from source to target without intermediate drop-offs, it is NP-hard to approximate
minx cost(x,w
′) to within any constant approximation ratio less than 367/366 [6, Theorem 9].
There, the bottleneck lies in finding the optimal permutation piOpt to minimize the travel distances,
see Equation (4). For k > 1, we first have to partition the packages into (possibly empty) subsets
M1, . . . ,Mk. Contrary to A
∗ and Am, we will need exponential time O(km) to enumerate all
partitions. Next, for every fixed partition of the packages into subsets Mi, we look for a package
order pix(i1), pix(i2), . . . , pix(i|Mi|) given by a permutation pix of {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that we get an
approximation guarantee on di(x).
Stacker-Crane problem. The latter can be modeled as the Stacker-Crane problem, which
asks for the following: Given a weighted graph GSCP with a set of directed arcs and a set of
undirected edges, find the minimum tour that uses each arc at least once. Since we restrict ourselves
to the two additional conditions (i) direct delivery of each package, (ii) return of each agent i in the
end, we can model the transport of package j along a shortest path by a directed edge from sj to tj :
Hence we choose the graph GSCP to consist of node pi and all nodes sj , tj , j = i1, . . . , i|Mi|, together
with directed arcs (sj , tj) of weight distG(sj , tj) (corresponding to the length of a shortest path
between sj and tj in G) and undirected edges {tj1, sj2} , {pi, sj} , {pi, tj} of weights corresponding
to the original distances distG(tj1, sj2) between tj1, sj2 (respectively distG(pi, sj), distG(pi, tj)). For
the Stacker-Crane problem, a polynomial-time 1.8-approximation due to Frederickson et al. is
known [16]. It remains to iterate over all assignments of the packages to the k agents as in the
presented Algorithm Ak.
Theorem 8. Algorithm Ak runs in time O (poly(n,m, k) · km) and finds an approximate solution
S of cost(S,w′) ≤ 1.8 ·minx∈R?noCcost(x,w′).
Proof. Algorithm Ak first enumerates over all lists of exactly k possibly empty sets of the pack-
ages. This can be implemented to run in time O(km) by choosing for each of the m packages
the subset of packages Mi it belongs to. We know that for each list of exactly k possibly empty
lists there is a corresponding solution x ∈ R?noC and vice versa (Fact 2). In particular there
exists a list M = (M1, . . . ,Mk) of lists M1, . . . ,Mk for each optimal solution Opt(R
?
noC) ∈
arg minx∈R?noC {cost(x,w′)}. Algorithm Ak at some point considers the list of exactly k possi-
bly empty sets M1, . . . ,Mk (where there is no prescribed order of the elements in each of the
Mi, i = 1, . . . , k). Applying the Stacker-Crane approximation algorithm, A
k approximates each
of the travelling distances di(Opt(R
?
noC)) of the agents by a factor of at most 1.8. Hence A
k also
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Algorithm Ak (for a constant number k of agents)
Input: Connected graph G, k agents, m packages.
Output: A 1.8-approximate solution S ∈ R?noC.
1: Brute-force enumeration over all lists of exactly k possibly empty sets of the packages.
foreach list of k sets (M1, . . . ,Mk) do
foreach agent i do
a: Model the delivery of the packages Mi (by agent i) as a Stacker-Crane problem.
b: Compute a solution x|Mi such that di(x) is a 1.8-approximation.
end foreach
c: Add delivery problem solution x, combined from the k Stacker-Crane solutions x|Mi ,
to the set of solutions RAk .
end foreach
2: Define algorithm Ak as taking the best among all solutions in RAk with respect to the input
weights w′:
Ak(w′) := arg min
x∈R
Ak
{cost(x,w′)} .
considers a solution S′ ∈ R?noC of cost
cost(S′, w′) =
k∑
i=1
w′i · di(S′) ≤
k∑
i=1
w′i · 1.8 · di(Opt(R?noC)) = 1.8 · min
x∈R?noC
cost(x,w′).
Since this solution S′ is contained in the built set RAk , we know that S := Ak(w′) has cost(S,w′) ≤
cost(S′, w′) ≤ 1.8 ·minx∈R?noC cost(x,w′).
Theorem 9. For a constant number of agents k, there exists an exponential-time truthful VCG
mechanism (Ak, P ), satisfying voluntary participation, with approximation ratio ≤ 3.6.
Proof. The approximation follows from Theorem 2 and Theorem 8. The latter theorem also im-
plies the running time of the mechanism. Truthfulness and voluntary participation can be proved
essentially in the same way as for Theorem 6. Indeed, the set of solutions RAk is computed in-
dependently of the input weights w′, and thus the last step defining Ak satisfy the condition of
Theorem 1 (implying truthfulness). As for voluntary participation, we observe that when Ak is
run on input (⊥, w′−i), the computed solution corresponds to some list of k − 1 sets (agent i is not
present), and the same solution is considered on input w′ as a list of k sets, where one set is empty.
This implies that the algorithm satisfies cost(Ak(w′), w′) ≤ cost(Ak(⊥, w′−i), w′), i.e., Fact 1 and
thus voluntary participation.
3.3 Comparison of the algorithms
We conclude our results on truthful approximation mechanisms with a comparison of the three
given algorithms A∗ (general setting, polynomial time), Am (FPT, parametrized by the number of
packages m) and Ak (exponential time for a constant number of agents k), given in Figure 4. Each
of the three algorithms chooses an optimal solution from a respective set RA∗ , RAm , RAk . To ensure
voluntary participation, in each set we include solutions where individual agents are not present
– in this way, we can set the payments according to Clarke’s pivot rule (2). All three algorithms
make use of Theorem 2 which bounds the Benefit of Collaboration BoC∗ by 2 (this can be seen
directly in the definition of the algorithms Am, Ak, for algorithm A∗ this follows from the black box
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algorithm Apos [6, Theorem 13]). In fact, the first version of the algorithm A
m computes a set RAm
which consists of all the solutions in R?noC – the improved version of A
m discards solutions of high
cost early on (while still considering solutions where individual agents are not present), in order
to limit the set RAm to a small (FPT -) size, parametrized by the number of packages. Finally, we
can compare the approximation guarantees. For algorithm A∗ the approximation ratio of 4 · wmaxwmin
follows from the (same) approximation ratio of Apos. Both A
m and Ak have a factor of BoC∗ ≤ 2,
with an additional factor of 1.8 for Ak since we need to approximate the planning of each agent’s
tour (which we model with stacker-crane).
4 Single Package and Frugality
For the case of a single package, we define two truthful VCG mechanisms. The optimal mechanism
which minimizes the social cost using any number of agents, and the lonely mechanism which
computes the solution of minimal cost under the constraint of using only one single agent. In both
mechanisms, we use the VCG payments (1) with Clarke pivot rule (2) in order to satisfy voluntary
participation.
Theorem 10 (Theorem 2 in [6]). For m = 1, the optimal solution using a single agent, as well as
the optimal solution using any number of agents, can be computed in polynomial time.
Fact 3. Both the exact and the lonely mechanisms are truthful since the algorithms are optimal
with respect to a fixed subset of solutions, i.e., they satisfy the condition of Theorem 1. Moreover,
the mechanisms run in polynomial time by Theorem 10.
In the following, we bound the total payments of these mechanisms compared with the cost of
the optimal solution (for the given input). In other words, assuming the reported weights are the
true weights (w′ = w), we would like the mechanism to not pay much more than the optimum for
these weights w = w′. This property is usually termed frugality [14, 3].
We first observe that, if we care more about the total payment made to the agents than about the
optimality of the final solution, then in some instances it may pay off to run the lonely mechanism
instead of the optimal mechanism. However, in other instances, the converse happens, meaning
that neither mechanism is always better than the other.
In order to compare the optimal mechanism with the lonely mechanism, it is useful to define
the following shorthands:
OPT = cost(Aopt(w
′), w′) , OPT−i = cost(Aopt(⊥, w′−i), w′−i) ,
LOPT = cost(Alon(w
′), w′) , LOPT−i = cost(Alon(⊥, w′−i), w′−i) ,
Solution space for delivery
RAm = R
∗
noC
RA∗
RAk
OPT Am(w′)
A∗(w′)
Ak(w′)
cost(Am(w′)) ≤ 2 · cost(Opt, w′)
Ratios between the computed solutions:
cost(A∗(w′)) ≤ 4wmaxwmin · cost(Opt, w′)
cost(Ak(w′)) ≤ 1.8 · cost(Am(w′), w′)
≤ 3.6 · cost(Opt, w′)
(Benefit of Collaboration)
(Algorithm Apos )
(Benefit of Collaboration)
(Stacker-Crane)
Figure 4: Venn diagram of the subsets of solutions RA∗ , RAm , RAk considered by the given algo-
rithms. Depending on the actual instance, the intersection of RA∗ and RAk might be empty.
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Figure 5: Delivery examples and their optimal solution. (left) The optimal mechanism pays more
than the lonely mechanism. (right) The lonely mechanism pays more than the optimal mechanism.
where Aopt is the optimal algorithm, and Alon is the lonely algorithm, that is, the one computing
the optimal solution using a single agent. Then the VCG payments (1) with the Clarke pivot rule
in (2) can be rewritten as follows in the two cases:
Pi(w
′) = OPT−i −
(
OPT − w′i · di(Aopt(w′))
)
, (5)
Pi(w
′) = LOPT−i −
(
LOPT − w′i · di(Alon(w′))
)
. (6)
Below, we usually omit the agents’ weights w′ = w whenever they are clear from the context.
Fact 4. The lonely mechanism pays the selected agent i an amount LOPT−i, and the other agents
get no payment. This is because LOPT = w′i·di(Alon(w′)) when i is selected, and for all non-selected
agent j 6= i, LOPT = LOPT−j and dj(Alon(w′)) = 0.
Theorem 11. For a single package, there are instances where the optimal mechanism pays a total
amount of money larger than what the lonely mechanism does. Moreover, there are instances in
which the opposite happens, that is, the lonely mechanism pays more.
Proof. First we prove that there are instances, in which the optimal mechanism pays more. The
example in Figure 5 (left) shows an instance and its optimal solution. The optimum for the
instance in which agent 1 is not present has cost OPT−1 = 40 (let agent 3 do the whole work).
More generally, one can check that OPT−1 = OPT−2 = 40 and OPT−3 = 45, and obviously
OPT = 9 + 12 + 16 = 37. Using these values for the payments (5), we get P1 = 40− (37− 9) = 12,
P2 = 40 − (37 − 12) = 15, P3 = 45 − (37 − 16) = 24, for a total amount of 51 payed by this
mechanism to the agents. The lonely mechanism will instead select agent 3 and pay only this agent
(see Fact 4) an amount LOPT−3 = 6 · (2+2+4) = 48, which is the lonely optimum for the instance
where agent 3 is not present.
On the other hand, the example in Figure 5 (right) shows an instance in which the lonely
mechanism pays more. The optimal solution has cost is OPT = 18 + 10 + 10 = 38 and we get
OPT−1 = 40, OPT−2 = 46 and OPT−3 = 38, resulting in the payments P1 = 40 − (38 − 18) =
20, P2 = 46 − (38 − 10) = 18, P3 = 38 − (38 − 10) = 10 for a total amount of 48. The lonely
mechanism will instead select agent 2 and pay LOPT−2 = 50.
We remark that the payments given by (1) and (2) guarantee voluntary participation, and
therefore the mechanism must pay a total amount of at least the optimum. We show that both
mechanisms pay only a small constant factor over the optimum, except when a single agent can do
the work for a much cheaper price than the others (as shown in Example 1):
Definition 6 (monopoly-free). We say that an instance with a single package is monopoly-free if
there is an optimal solution which uses at least two agents.
Example 1. Both the exact and the lonely mechanism perform equally bad if, for instance, there is
only one very cheap agent and another very expensive one. Consider two agents of weights w1 = 
small, and w2 = L large, both agents sitting on the starting position s1 of the package. In this
case the two mechanisms output the same solution and payment: Agent 1 does the whole work and
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gets an amount of money given by the best alternative solution. We have P1 = w2 dist(s1, t1) =
Ldist(s1, t1), while the optimum is w1 dist(s1, t1) = dist(s1, t1).
Theorem 12. In any single package monopoly-free instance, the optimal mechanism pays a total
amount of money which is at most twice the optimum.
Proof. The optimal solution selects a certain number ` ≥ 2 of agents and assigns to each of them
some path. By renaming the agents, we can therefore assume that the optimum cost is of the
form OPT = w1d1 +w2d2 + · · ·+w`d`, where no agent appears twice and the weights must satisfy
wi ≥ wi+1 and wi ≤ 2wi+1, for otherwise agent i can replace agent i + 1 or vice versa. We shall
prove below that
OPT−i ≤ OPT + widi. (7)
Using VCG payments (1), we obtain from (7) that every agent is payed at most twice her cost,
Pi ≤ OPT +widi− (OPT −widi) = 2widi, which then implies the theorem. To complete the proof,
we show (7) by distinguishing two cases. For i < `, we can replace agent i with agent i+1 who then
has to travel an additional distance of at most 2di to reach i and come back to its position. This
gives an upper bound: OPT−i ≤ OPT − widi + wi+12di ≤ OPT + widi, where the last inequality
is due to wi+1 ≤ wi. For i = `, we replace agent i by agent ` − 1 who travels an extra amount
d`, and obtain this upper bound: OPT−` ≤ OPT − w`d` + w`−1d` ≤ OPT + w`d`, where the last
inequality is due to w`−1 ≤ 2w`.
Theorem 13. In any single package monopoly-free instance, the lonely mechanism pays at most
2BoC times the optimum, where BoC = 1/ ln 2 ≈ 1.44 (by Theorem 2).
Proof. Let i be the selected agent. A crude upper bound on the sum of the payments can be
obtained via Fact 4, where the second inequality requires the instance to be monopoly-free: Pi =
LOPT−i ≤ BoC ·OPT−i
(7)
≤ BoC · (OPT + widi) ≤ BoC · 2 ·OPT .
5 Conclusion and open questions
This work initiates the study of truthful mechanisms for delivery in a natural setting where mobile
agents are selfish and can speculate about their own energy consumption rate. We considered
mechanisms which are truthful, run in polynomial-time, have a worst-case approximation guarantee
and, possibly, do not pay the agents abnormal amounts (frugality). We provide such polynomial-
time truthful approximation mechanisms for two cases: (1) when the consumption rate of different
agents are similar, i.e., the ratio max wiwj is bounded (see Theorem 4) and (2) when the number of
packages m is small (see Theorem 7). For a single package, we also gave bounds on the frugality of
two natural truthful mechanisms which return the optimum or an approximation of the optimum.
The main open question is whether there exists a polynomial-time constant-factor approxima-
tion independent of the weights. This remains an intriguing open question even for a constant
number of agents k, for which we presented an exponential-time truthful approximation mecha-
nism.
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